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1 Introduction
In spite of the now large literature on capital tax competition, there have been relatively few systematic
analyses of the interaction between the level of tax competition and the political process by which taxes
are chosen. An early and important exception1 is Persson and Tabellini(1992), who stress that with tax
competition, voters in a country generally vote strategically by choosing a candidate who, once in oﬃce,
will tax capital more than the median voter would - in their model, such a candidate has less than the
median endowment of capital i.e. is poorer. By this means, the voters precommit to a higher tax rate,
thus counteracting the ex post incentive of the policy-maker, once in oﬃce, to under-tax capital. So,
intensification of tax competition, due to increased capital mobility (capital market integration, CMI),
will also induce a change in the choice of candidate from a richer to a poorer one. Generally, this model
exhibits what Persson and Tabellini elsewhere call double-edged incentives: that is, “incentives in the
domestic policy process spill over into the international arena, and international strategic considerations
partly shape domestic policy” (Persson and Tabellini(1995)). The eﬀect of increased capital mobility
changes each of these incentives: it sharpens the incentive to cut taxes due to international strategic
considerations, but also increases the incentive to change to a more tax-friendly political representative.
Here, we focus on two aspects of this important paper. First, note that in Persson and Tabellini
(1992), the political precommitment eﬀect requires representative democracy. That is, in their model,
with direct democracy i.e. majority voting over the tax rate, there would be no political eﬀect of
increased CMI, and thus no double-edged incentives, in the sense that (i) the policy-maker’s identity is
fixed,2 whatever the level of capital mobility, and (ii) his choice of tax rate only responds to increased
CMI via the increase in the marginal cost of public funds. Second3, the economic eﬀect is dominant:
that is, increased capital mobility can never lead to a rise in the equilibrium tax rate, only a smaller
fall than would occur in the absence of the political eﬀect.
This raises two questions: first, is representative, rather than direct democracy, a necessary
condition for double-edged incentives to arise? And, second,4 in a model with double-edged incentives,
1Other, more recent contributions are discussed in Section 6.
2In this case the median voter is always the individual with the median level of endowment of the good in the first
period.
3This is certainly the case for the symmetric equilibrium in the symmetric model: Persson and Tabellini(1992) do not
discuss asymmetric equilibria, and the analysis of their model in the asymmetric case would be very diﬃcult: one would
have to solve for asymmetric Nash equilibrium in taxes, given any configuration of government types in the two countries,
derive equilibrium types and then calculate the consequences for equilibrium taxes. In any case, it seems very unlikely
that one would find that the equilibrium tax would rise in all (i.e. both) countries, as we do here.
4We should stress that there are already a number of papers which show that equilibrium taxes may rise in some
or all countries following CMI (for instance, DePater and Myers (1994), Wilson (1987), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997),
Noiset(1995) and Wooders, Zissimos and Dhillon(2001)). However, none of these models exhibit double-edged incentives,
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can the political eﬀect of CMI ever dominate the economic eﬀect? These are both interesting questions,
we would argue, for diﬀerent reasons. They are both of some theoretical interest, but the second is
also of practical interest, as there is a growing body of empirical evidence that CMI has not clearly led
to cuts in corporate tax rates, at least for OECD countries. Specifically, recent studies by Hallerberg
and Basinger (1998), (2001), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano(2002), Garrett(1998), Quinn(1997)
Rodrik(1997), Swank and Steinmo(2002)) find rather mixed eﬀects5 of relaxation of exchange controls
on the capital account on corporate tax rates.
In this paper, we present a simple model of tax competition, where as in Persson and Tabellini(1992,
1995, 2000 Ch 12.4), citizens within a country diﬀer in wealth. Unlike Persson and Tabellini (PT here-
after), democracy is direct, rather than representative. In our model, there are double-edged incentives
in the sense made precise above. We show that the (symmetric) equilibrium tax can rise in all countries
following CMI.
The key feature of our model is that, unlike PT, there are two factors of production in every
country, one internationally immobile (labour) and one possibly internationally mobile (capital), and
the before-tax prices of factors are not fixed. So, in this model, following capital market integration, the
incidence of the capital tax changes: part of the burden of the tax shifts from owners of capital to owners
of labour. Now, suppose that agents within a given country are heterogenous, in the sense that diﬀerent
agents in that country own diﬀerent shares of the total capital stock and the total stock of labour, and
also decisions over tax rates are made by majority voting. Then the change in the incidence of the
capital tax, following CMI, will be reflected in the way majority voting aggregates policy preferences
into domestic policies.
For simplicity, we assume that labour and savings are inelastically supplied in each country, and
that each country is “small” i.e. takes the world interest rate as given. In this environment, the change
in the incidence of the capital tax is dramatic. Without capital mobility, owners of capital bear the
entire burden of the tax, as the after-tax price of capital decreases and the wage is fixed by the level of
inelastically supplied savings. With capital mobility, instead, the entire burden of the tax is shifted to
owners of the immobile factor of production (labour), as each country takes the world interest rate as
in that the eﬀect does not occur due to a spillover from the domestic political process: rather, the rise is taxes is generated
by some modification of the economic environment relative to the standard tax competition model. These contributions
are all discussed in more detail in Section 6.
5In particular, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano(2002) is probably the most comprehensive, as it allows for four
diﬀerent measures of exchange controls, and studies not only statutory rates of corporate tax, but also eﬀective marginal
and average rates, for almost all OECD countries, and allows for strategic interaction in corporate tax setting between
countries. It finds that depending on the choice of measure of capital controls and corporate tax rates, a unilateral or
multilateral liberalisation of controls may lower or raise corporate taxes. This is broadly consistent with the findings of
Quinn(1997) and Rodrik(1997): Garrett(1998) and Swank and Steinmo(2002) who simply find that capital controls have
no significant eﬀect.
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given, and the wage depends on the net flow of capital. Then, by the tax incidence eﬀect, the median
voter in the closed economy case is the owner of the median share of the capital endowment, whereas
the median voter in the open economy case is the owner of the median share of the labour endowment.6
Moreover, in either case, the higher the relevant median voter’s share of the relevant endowment, the
greater the share of the cost of the public good paid by that median voter. So, other things equal, if the
median voter’s share of the capital endowment is high, and his share of the labour endowment is low,
the median voter’s demand for the public good (and therefore the tax) will be low in the closed economy,
and high in the open economy. We call this the tax incidence eﬀect of capital market integration.
Of course, following capital market integration, other things are not equal: from the point of
view of the median voter in a given country, the elasticity of supply of capital, formerly zero, is now
positive, and so the marginal cost of public funds rises from unity to a value greater than unity, causing
the policy-maker to choose a lower tax. Call this latter eﬀect the tax competition eﬀect. Of course, this
eﬀect is also present in the PT model. However - and this is the main result of our paper - in our model,
it is perfectly possible for the incidence eﬀect to outweigh the tax competition eﬀect, so that equilibrium
tax rates rise, following capital market integration. Indeed, under some conditions (basically, when the
marginal cost of public funds is close to unity in the open economy) the diﬀerence in the median shares
does not have to be large to result in a rise in capital taxes.7
This main result is first derived for the case where labour income is not taxed. One reason
for doing this is that in this case, our model eﬀectively reduces to an extension of the classic Zodrow-
Mieskowski model, extended to allow for agents who have diﬀerent capital and labour endowments. Our
results therefore also extend in various ways (fully explained in Section 6) the many papers that use
this model. Also, we note that the results are qualitatively similar (but easier to derive and interpret)
to the ones when labour and capital are taxed at a common uniform rate.
The same basic eﬀect will also be at work if both labour and capital can be taxed at diﬀerent
rates. There are complications, however: in particular, as the policy space is then multi-dimensional,
some restrictions on the joint distribution of capital and labour endowments are required to ensure a
well-defined median voter and thus a Condorcet Winner. Our main finding is that when the median
voter has a relatively larger capital than labour endowment, he will choose a capital subsidy in the
closed economy, but the capital tax in the open economy is zero. So, our counter-intuitive finding is
6Note that these may in fact be diﬀerent agents, so we may have a shifting median voter. However, as argued below,
the shifting median voter per se does not drive our results.
7Of course, the logic of the above argument is that a necessary condition for this to occur is that the endowments of
the fixed factor are more unequally distributed than those of the mobile factor. Given that the fixed factor is labour,
this is empirically rather implausible, see for instance Goodman et. al. (1997). However, one can reconcile our result
with the stylized fact that labour income is more equally distributed than income from capital by introducing preference
heterogeneity for the public good (see Section 5.1 below).
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robust to the taxation of labour.
Our result that CMI aﬀects political incentives, i.e. the policy preferences of voters, and that this
in turn may lead to higher capital taxation is also related to the recent work of Kessler, Lulfesmann and
Myers (2002). In that model, agents diﬀer only with respect to their capital endowment, and capital
taxes fund a lump-sum transfer to all residents. Moreover, capital is perfectly mobile, and labour is
imperfectly mobile (there are migration costs). Their main result is that in this setting, a reduction in
migration costs (further integration of the labour market) leads to an increase in the capital tax when
countries are symmetric. The intuition is the following: ”The integration of labour markets reduces
the incentives for voters to attract foreign capital through lowering national tax rates because it at the
same time causes an inflow of labour, which is detrimental to a majority” (Kessler, Lulfesmann and
Myers(2002)). So, both the result and the reasoning behind it are rather diﬀerent to our paper. More
broadly, however, both their paper and this one indicate that the under-taxation results of the classic
Zodrow-Mieskowski model are not robust to apparently quite minor changes.
The organisation of the paper is the following: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibria with and without capital mobility when labour taxes are constrained to be zero.
Section 4 does the same in the general case. In Section 5 we discuss possible extensions. Section 6
discusses related literature in some depth and finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are a large number j = 1, ..m of identical countries. Each country is populated by a number
of agents i ∈ N = {1, ..n}, where n is odd. There are two periods. In the first period, agent i in any
country decides how much to save out of her initial endowment of the consumption good, ei. In the
second period, the saved endowment of this agent, ki, can be sold to firms as an input (the capital
input). Each agent also has an endowment of labour time, li, which can also be sold to firms as an
input. There is a number of identical firms in each country, which transform the two inputs into the
consumption good using a constant-returns technology. The labour input is internationally immobile,
but the capital input may be internationally mobile(CMI) or not. The government in any country
provides a public good by taxing the income generated by the use of capital and labour inputs. Capital
income is taxed on a source basis. We now turn to discuss each component of the model in more detail.
The timing of events is as follows.8 First, the taxes τw, τr are determined by majority voting at
the beginning of period 1. Then, given taxes, the saving decision is made at the end of period 1. Then,
at the beginning of period 2, firms choose their capital and labour inputs, and the prices of the factors
8This timing follows Persson and Tabellini(1992). However, due to the special form of first-period preferences, savings
are perfectly inelastic in our model, and so there is no ”capital levy” problem. So, the outcome would be the same if
voting on taxes took place after the savings decision were made.
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are determined. Finally, production and second-period consumption take place.
Now we turn to the consumption, savings, and labour supply decisions of agent i ∈ N in a typical
country.9 The present value of utility of such an agent is assumed to be of the form
ui = αmin{ci, cˆ}+ di + v(g) (1)
where ci, di are consumption levels in periods 1,2, g is a level of public good provision in period 2, and
cˆ is a satiation level of consumption in period 1. Also, v(.) is assumed to have the standard properties
that v0(.) > 0 and v00(.) < 0 for all non-negative g. Note that the agent does not value leisure so that
labour time li will always be inelastically supplied.
First and second-period personal budget constraints are
ci = ei − ki (2)
di = rki + (w − τw)li (3)
where r and w are prices of the capital and labour inputs respectively, r is understood to be the price
net of tax, and τw is the tax labour income. Substituting the personal budget constraints (2),(3) into
(1), we get:
ui = αmin{ei − ki, cˆ}+ rki + (w − τw)li + v(g) (4)
We assume α is large enough10 so that i wants to consume up to cˆ in period 1. In this case, optimal
savings choice is simply ki = ei− cˆ, and is thus independent of factor prices. We assume for convenience
that
P
i∈N li =
P
i∈N ki = 1, so that ki, li measure not only the absolute endowment of the two factors
of agent i, but also agent i0s share of the aggregate endowment of each of these factors in his country
of residence.
Now consider the behaviour of firms. These are assumed competitive, i.e. they take factor prices
as given. Due to the assumed constant returns to scale, we can assume without loss of generality that
there is only one firm in each country, with a production function in intensive form of F (k˜), where k˜
is the amount of capital employed by the firm in a typical country per unit of labour. F (.) has the
standard properties, F (0) = 0, F 0(.) > 0, F 00(.) < 0. In the closed economy case, the price of the capital
input adjusts to the point where it is optimal for the firm to use one unit of capital i.e.
F 0(1) = rc + τr (5)
where τr is the tax on capital income. In the open economy case, the demand for capital by the firm is
implicitly given by
F 0(k˜) = ro + τ r (6)
9For convenince, we do not introduce country sub- or superscripts at this stage.
10This requires that α > r. In the case where τw = 0, as discussed below, r ≤ F 0(1). In the general case, r ≤ F (1). So,
in general, we assume α > max{F 0(1), F (1)}.
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Finally, the wage adjusts to the point where it is optimal for the firm to employ one unit of labour, so
the wage is
w(k˜) = F (k˜)− k˜F 0(k˜) (7)
noting that if the economy is closed, k˜ = 1.
Turing now to determination of the taxes, the government budget constraint is g = τrk˜+τw where
k˜ = 1 in the closed economy case. So, substituting the government budget constraint and (5) into (4),
the overall payoﬀ to i in the second period is
ui =



(F 0(1)− τr)ki + (w(1)− τw)li + v(τ r + τw) (closed)
roki + (w(k˜)− τw)li + v(τ rk˜ + τw) (open)
. (8)
Then, (τw, τr) are determined simultaneously in each country by majority voting as described in the
following sections. In particular, in the open-economy case, the voters in each country are assumed
to take ro as given
11 (i.e. each country is assumed small relative to the international market for the
capital input), in which case they rationally anticipate that the capital employed in that country will be
determined by (6), given tax τ r. Also, taxes must be feasible in the sense that they generate non-negative
revenue (as g ≥ 0) and also imply non-negative post-tax prices for labour and capital.
As these feasibility constraints play an important role in what follows, it is helpful to state them
formally. Non-negative revenue requires that τw + k˜τr ≥ 0. From (7), a non-negative wage requires
τw ≤ w(k˜). From (5), in the closed economy, a non-negative price of capital rc ≥ 0 requires τr ≤ F 0(1).
In the open economy case, as ro is exogenous, there is no upper bound on τr. So, in the closed economy
case, recalling k˜ = 1, the feasible set of taxes is
Sc = {(τw, τr) |τw + τr ≥ 0, τw ≤ w(1), τ r ≤ F 0(1)}
In the open-economy case, taking ro as given, and recalling k˜ = k(ro + τ r), the feasible set of taxes is
So = {(τw, τ r) |τw + k(ro + τ r)τr ≥ 0, τw ≤ w(k(ro + τ r))}
Note that we have allowed the taxes to be individually negative i.e. we allow for a wage or capital
subsidy. The reason for doing so is discussed in Section 4 below.
We can now comment on how this model relates to the literature. First, if τw = 0, so that
only the mobile factor is taxed, then the model is eﬀectively the well-known model of Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson(1986) (ZMW model henceforth), extended to allow for heterogeneity in
the ownership of factors of production (and also allowing for endogenous savings). The model is also
related quite closely to that of PT. The main diﬀerences are that in our model: (i) apart from capital,
there is also a factor of production which is internationally immobile and its returns are not exogenously
fixed; and (ii) democracy is direct, rather than representative.
11Implicitly, they also take the taxes in other countries as given, but these taxes only aﬀect citizens’ payoﬀs though ro.
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Finally, we note that an analysis of the model as it stands is somewhat involved, because the
policy space (τw, τ r) is two-dimensional in each country. Consequently, with unrestricted distributions
of capital and labour endowments {ki}i∈N , {li}i∈N , voting cycles will generally arise. So, we begin in
the next Section, Section 3, by illustrating the tax incidence eﬀect, and obtaining our key results in the
special setting where the fixed factor is untaxed i.e. τw = 0. In this case, from Sc, So, the feasibility
constraints on the capital tax are simply 0 ≤ τr ≤ F 0(1) in the closed economy, and τr ≥ 0 in the open
economy.
3 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition with an
Untaxed Fixed Factor
3.1 Majority Voting Equilibrium in Closed and Open Economies
First consider the closed economy. Recall that τw = 0 by assumption, and set τr = τ . Then, from (8),
the payoﬀ of agent i ∈ N in any country is
ui(τ) = (F 0(1)− τ)ki + w(1)li + v(τ) (9)
It is clear from (9) that only the weights ki given by capital endowments will aﬀect voter preferences
over τ . Note that the above function ui(τ) is strictly concave in τ as v is assumed strictly concave. So,
preferences over τ are single-peaked for all i ∈ N. Let τ ci be the ideal tax of agent i i.e. the tax that
maximises (9) subject to the feasibility constraint that τ ∈ [0, F 0(1)]. For an interior solution, this is
given by the condition
v0(τ ci ) = ki (10)
That is, the marginal benefit of the public good is equal to type i0s share of the capital stock. This is
because the tax is borne entirely by immobile capital, ki is also i
0s share of the cost of the public good.
Note also that if ki > v
0(0), then we have a corner solution with τ ci = 0, and if ki < v0(F 0(1)), then we
have a corner solution with τ ci = F 0(1).
Now, let p ∈ N be the agent with the median capital endowment.12 It follows from the fact that
τ ci is decreasing in ki that the voter with the median ideal tax is just the median voter with respect to
the capital endowment. Then, the outcome of majority voting over τ will be that τ cp is chosen. In what
follows, we will assume that τ cp is interior. So we have proved:
Proposition 1. Assume v0(0) ≥ kp ≥ v0(F 0(1)). Then, in the closed economy case, the equilibrium tax
in each country is τ c = τ cp, where τ cp solves (10) above with i = p.
12Formally, for any i, let Ai = {j ∈ N |kj ≤ ki } , and ai = #Ai/n. Then, p is the value of the index for which ap−1 <
0.5 < ap
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Now consider the open economy case. Here, as each country is small, voters take ro as fixed and
thus from (6), they perceive that k˜ = k(ro + τ), with dk/dτ = 1/F 00(k˜). So, from (8), the pay-oﬀ of
agent i in any country, is
ui(τ , ro) ≡ roki + w(k(ro + τ))li + v(τk(ro + τ)). (11)
It is now clear from (11) that only the weights li given by the labour endowment will aﬀect voter
preferences over τ . We will assume that the above function is strictly quasi-concave with respect to τ
for any li and any ro, which is suﬃcient to ensure that preferences over τ are single-peaked for all i ∈ N,
given ro fixed. Let τoi be the ideal tax of a type i agent. This maximises (11) subject to the constraint
that the tax be feasible i.e. that τ ∈ [0,∞). Assuming an interior13 solution, after simple manipulation,
we see that τoi satisfies the simple condition:
v0(τoi k(ro + τoi )) = µ(τoi , k(ro + τoi ))li (12)
where
µ(τ , k) = 1³
1 + τkF 00(k)
´
is the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) in the open economy, evaluated at any τ , for a fixed ro.
Note that µ(τoi , k(ro + τoi )) > 1 as τ > 0, so an interior solution requires li ≤ v0(0). If li > v0(0), then
we have a corner solution with τoi = 0.
From (12), the marginal cost of a unit of the public good to i is now his share li of labour, the
immobile factor (as the tax now falls entirely on the immobile factor), times the marginal cost of public
funds. Given the assumptions made so far, it can be shown straightforwardly14 that the higher the cost
share li, the lower the ideal tax τoi at a given interest rate ro.
Now let q ∈ N be the agent with the median labour endowment.15 So, it follows that in the open
economy case, the voter with the median ideal tax is now just the median voter with respect to the
labour endowment. Then, the outcome of majority voting over τ will be that voter q will prevail. Note
that in the open economy case, τoq depends on ro, but as all countries are identical, the only possible
equilibrium is where taxes are the same in all countries, and hence ro is such that k(ro + τoq) = 1. If q0s
ideal tax is interior, it will therefore satisfy
v0(τoq) = µ(τoq, 1)lq (13)
13Note also from (12) that for any fixed ro, if li > v
0(0), then we have a corner solution with τoi = 0.
14Strict quasi-concavity of ui(τ , ro) with respect to τ for any li and any ro implies that ∂2ui(τoi , ro)/∂τ2 < 0. This in
turn implies directly that the ratio v0(τoi k(ro + τoi ))/µ(τoi , ro) is strictly decreasing with τoi for any li. Hence, we can see
directly from (12) that the higher li, the lower τoi , as long as τoi is interior.
15Formally, let Bi = {j ∈ N |lj ≤ li } , and bi = #Bi/n. Then q ∈ N is the value of the index for which bq−1 < 0.5 < bq .
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As in the closed economy case, we wish, for simplicity, to restrict attention to interior equilibrium taxes
i.e. those satisfying (13). This requires v0(0) ≥ lq. Also, as in equilibrium ro = F 0(1) − τoq, we must
restrict attention to equilibrium taxes τoq ≤ F 0(1) which imply a non-negative world interest rate. This
requires lq ≥ v0(F 0(1))/µ(F 0(1), 1). So, we have proved:
Proposition 2. Assume v0(0) ≥ lq ≥ v0(F 0(1))/µ(F 0(1), 1). Then, in the open economy case, the
equilibrium tax in each country is τo = τoq, where τoq solves (13) above.
3.2 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition
Following CMI, three things will happen. First, for any positive tax lower than the revenue-maximising
tax, the marginal cost of public funds rises from unity to µ > 1, as the supply of capital is now no
longer fixed in each country. Other things equal, this will lower the equilibrium tax, a well-known and
standard result.
However, with heterogenous agents, there are two other eﬀects of CMI. First, the identity of
the median voter may change i.e. p 6= q, which we call the shifting median voter eﬀect. In general, a
necessary condition for the existence of the shifting median voter eﬀect is that the endowments are not
perfectly positively or negatively rank-correlated, i.e. that it is not possible to label citizens so that
k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ...kn and either l1 ≤ l2 ≤ ..ln or ln ≤ ln−1 ≤ ...l1.
Second, whether or not there is a shifting median voter, if the median capital share is not equal
to the median labour share (i.e. kp 6= lq), his choice of tax rate will change. This is clear as from (10),
the equilibrium tax in the closed economy case is determined by kp, but from (13), the equilibrium tax
in the open economy case is determined by lq. As already remarked, this is due to the fact that in the
closed economy, the tax burden is entirely borne by capital, whereas in the open economy case, it is
borne by land. So, we say that there is an incidence eﬀect when kp 6= lq.
To understand the importance of these two eﬀects, our first benchmark result describes what
happens if both eﬀects are absent.16 This occurs, for instance, when the capital share of any i is equal
to her labour share i.e. ki = li = λi, all i ∈ N. Then, we can rank agents by this common share i.e.
λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ...λn. In this case, the median voter in both closed and open economies is m = (n+ 1)/2 i.e.
in our notation, p = q = m.
Proposition 3. If there is no incidence eﬀect or shifting median voter eﬀect i.e. if p = q = m and
km = lm = λm, then τ c > τo.
Proof. If kp = lq = λm, then the conditions defining τ c, τo become
v0(τ c) = λm, v0(τo) = µ(τo, 1)λm
So, as F 00 < 0 and τo > 0, µ(τo, 1) > 1, we have v0(τo) > v0(τ c). But then by strict concavity of v,
τo < τ c. ¤
16In all following results, we assume that the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
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That is, we have the standard result17 that CMI will reduce the equilibrium tax, because capital
mobility leads to a higher cost of public funds.
Now we show how this “standard” result can be overturned by the incidence eﬀect. This happens
in a very simple and striking way. The general idea is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 in here
The figure graphs the marginal benefit of the public good, g i.e. v0(g), and also the marginal cost
to the relevant median voter of providing that level of the public good (kp in the closed economy, and
lqµ(g, 1) in the open economy). In the Figure, the median voter in the closed economy has a high capital
share, and thus desires a low level of g and thus a low tax, but the median voter in the open economy
has a low labour share, and thus desires a higher level of g and thus a higher tax. This eﬀect more than
oﬀsets the reduction in the tax due to an increase in the marginal cost of public funds generated by
capital mobility i.e. the fact that µ is increasing in g.
Of course, the Figure merely illustrates a possibility: the following example shows that this
possibility can actually occur.
Example 1 Assume quadratic preferences and technology i.e. v(g) = g−ζg2/2, ζ > 0, and F (k) = k−
φk2/2, 1 > φ > 0. The constraints on φ ensure that F (k) has the standard properties in the neighborhood
of the Nash equilibrium i.e. F 0(1) = 1 − φ > 0, F 00(1) = −φ < 0. We also need to assume that v0 is
positive at all feasible taxes, which, from concavity, requires only that v0(F 0(1)) = 1− ζ(1− φ) > 0.
Also, assume n = 3, and suppose for simplicity that voters can be ranked so that k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k3,
l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3, in which case p = q = m = 2 and the median voter is not shifting. Choose (l1, l2, l3) =
(0, 0, 1) i.e. so the median voter owns no immobile factor, but (k1, k2, k3) = (0, 0.5, 0.5) so the median
voter owns half the capital.
First, from (10) the equilibrium tax in the closed economy satisfies
k2 = 0.5 = v
0(τ c) = 1− ζτ c =⇒ τ c = 0.5ζ (14)
Also, in the open economy, l2 = 0, so the median voter pays none of the cost of the public good and so
chooses to maximise tax revenue τk(ro+τ). From the production function, k(ro+τ) = (1− (ro+τ))/φ,
so
τo = argmax
τ
τ(1− (ro + τ)) =
1− ro
2
But at symmetric equilibrium, all regions have the same capital stock, so the capital market equilibrium
condition can be written
ro + τo = F 0(1) = 1− φ
17Note that the classic results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986), Wilson(1986) follow from Proposition 3, because if all
agents are identical, i.e. ki = li =
1
n
, all i ∈ N, the hypotheses of Proposition 3 are clearly satisfied.
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Solving these two conditions simultaneously, we get τo = φ > 0. So, for τo > τ c, we need only φζ >
0.5. Also, the conditions for an interior solution in Propositions 1 and 2 reduce to
k2 = 0.5 ≥ v0(F 0(1)) = 1− ζ(1− φ)
l2 = 0 ≥ v0(F 0(1))/µ(F 0(1), 1) = (1− ζ(1− φ))
µ
1− (1− φ)φ
¶
So, the parameter restrictions are: φζ > 0.5, 0.5 ≥ 1− ζ(1− φ) > 0, φ ≤ 0.5. These are easily satisfied
simultaneously, for example, by φ = 0.4, ζ = 1.5. k
The final and important question then arises as to “how big” the incidence eﬀect (i.e. diﬀerence
between kp and lq) needs to be to get a reversal of the standard result. (In Example 1, for convenience,
the diﬀerence between the capital and labour shares, kp − lq, is assumed as large as possible, i.e. 0.5.)
To answer this question, note that if the median voters in closed and open economies have capital and
labour shares kp, lq > 0 respectively, then they will choose the same taxes in closed and open economy
cases if
kp = µ(τ(kp), 1)lq ≡ ψ(kp, lq)
where τ(kp) = v0−1(kp) is the tax chosen by the median voter in the closed economy. Moreover, it is
clear from (10),(13) that if k > ψ(k, l), τo > τ c, and vice versa. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4. τo is greater, equal to, or less than τ cas kp > ψ(kp, lq), kp = ψ(kp, lq), or kp < ψ(kp, lq)
respectively.
Note, due to µ > 1, that ψ(k, l) > l. So, the quantity
η =
µ
ψ(kp, lq)
lq
− 1
¶
× 100% > 0
is the minimum percentage by which the median capital endowment must exceed the median labour
endowment in order to get a reversal of the standard result that the equilibrium tax falls following CMI.
Example A1 in the Appendix shows, for appropriate choice of parameter values, that η can be small:
indeed, it is possible to choose parameters so that η can be arbitrarily close to zero. The intuition is
that for appropriate choice of parameters, the marginal cost of public funds µ can be made arbitrarily
close to one around τ(kp).
In Proposition 3, we have assumed also that median voter does not shift. However, the inspection
of the proof of this proposition makes it clear that non-shifting is not required (the result goes though as
long as kp = lq, even if p 6= q). In other words, shifting median voter eﬀect in itself has no eﬀect at all on
equilibrium taxes18, and thus on the relationship between τ c and τo. It is, nevertheless interesting (and
not noted in the literature, to our knowledge) that the identity of the median voter changes following
the opening of the economy.
18Another way of seeing this is to take an initial situation where the median voter does not shift (p = q), and then
consider a permutation of the labour endowments across individuals. So, now there is a shifting median voter. But, the
share of the median voter with respect to labour endowments, and thereby the incidence eﬀect, has not changed. So
neither τo nor τc change.
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4 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition: the Gen-
eral Case
4.1 Majority Voting Equilibrium in Closed and Open Economies
First consider the closed economy. From (8), the payoﬀ of agent i ∈ N in any country is
ui(τw, τr) = (F 0(1)− τr)ki + (w(1)− τw)li + v(τr + τw) (15)
It is now clear from (15) that both the capital endowment ki and the labour endowment li will aﬀect
voter preferences over (τr, τw). So, generally, there is multidimensionality in the preference parameters,
as well as in the policy space, and indeed, it is possible to show that generally, there will be no Condorcet
winner. Our approach, following Persson-Tabellini(2000) Ch 12, is to impose a linear restriction on the
relationship between the labour and capital endowments of any agent. This is suﬃcient to ensure that
voters have intermediate preferences (Persson-Tabellini(2000), Definition 4), and so a Condorcet winner
exists. Specifically, we assume that ki = a + bli, and a = (1 − b)/n to ensure that the conditionsP
i∈N ki =
P
i∈N li = 1 are satisfied. Then (15) becomes
ui(τw, τ r) = (F 0(1)b+ w(1))li − (τrb+ τw)li + (F 0(1)− τ r)
µ
1− b
n
¶
+ v(τ r + τw) (16)
Note from (16) that the ideal taxes of agent i only depend on his labour endowment (and the
constant (1 − b)/n). With these preferences, there exists a unique Condorcet Winner (τw, τr) ∈ Sc,
which is the ideal tax vector of the individual with the median labour endowment. Above, we defined
this individual as q : here, for convenience, we label this voter m, where m denotes the median labour
endowment. So, the equilibrium taxes (τ cw, τ cr) maximise um(τw, τ r), as defined in (15), subject to the
constraint that (τw, τr) ∈ Sc. The following proposition characterises these taxes:
Proposition 5. (i) Assume lm < km, v
0(0) > km > v0(F (1)). Then τ cw = w(1), and v0(w(1) + τ r) =
km. (ii) Assume lm > km, v
0(0) > lm > v0(F (1)). Then τ cr = F 0(1), and v0(F 0(1) + τw) = lm.
Proof. The proof is standard, given the objective function (15), the constraints (τw, τr) ∈ Sc, and the
strict concavity of v. ¤
Part (i) of this Proposition19 is illustrated below in Figure 2. As is clear in that figure, the
opportunity cost of the public good for the median voter is km. If demand for the public good at this
cost is below w(1) - the maximum labour tax - the maximum labour tax is employed, and the remainder
of the tax revenue is used to subsidise capital. If demand for the public good at this cost is above w(1),
the maximum labour tax is employed, and the additional revenue is raised though taxing capital. Part
(ii) has a similar interpretation.
19Note that the condition v0(0) > max{km, lm} > v0(F (1)) ensures positive provision and positive private consumption
in period 2.
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Figure 2 in here
Now consider the open economy case. Here, as each country is small, voters take ro as fixed and
thus from (6), they perceive that k˜ = k(ro + τr). So, from (8), the pay-oﬀ of agent i in any country, is
ui(τw, τr, ro) ≡ roki + (w(k(ro + τ r))− τw)li + v(τw + τrk(ro + τ r)). (17)
Now note that only the weights li given by the labour endowment will aﬀect voter preferences
over (τw, τ r). So, the relevant preference space is unidimensional and the intermediate preference condi-
tion in Persson-Tabellini(2000) is automatically satisfied, whatever the relationship between the labour
and capital endowments. So, the voter with the median labour endowment, m, is the median voter,
and consequently, the Condorcet-winning taxes (τow, τor) in the open economy maximise um(τw, τr, ro)
subject to the feasibility constraints on taxes that (τw, τr) ∈ So. Note that in the open economy case,
(τow, τor) depends on ro, but as all countries are identical, the only possible equilibrium is where taxes
are the same in all countries, and hence ro is such that k(ro + τor) = 1. These facts imply the following
characterization of equilibrium taxes in the open economy:
Proposition 6. Assume v0(0) > lm. If v0(w(1)) ≤ lm, τor = 0 and τow solves v0(τw) = lm. If
v0(w(1)) > lm, τor = 0, and τ cw = w(1).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.¤
Thus the capital tax is set to zero, whatever the labour and capital endowments of the median
voter. This result is reminiscent of the well-known finding that under non-cooperation, countries that
satisfy the assumptions of the aggregate production eﬃciency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
find it optimal not to tax capital at source.20 These assumptions are satisfied here, as returns from
investment are certain, there is free capital mobility, all commodities (including labour) can be taxed,
and producers are perfectly competitive.
4.2 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition
Comparing Propositions 5 and 6, the consequences of CMI for taxation of capital are clear. Generally,
the tax on capital changes from τ cr to zero. So, whenever τ cr > 0 we have confirmation of the ”standard”
kind of result that international tax competition lowers capital taxes. On the other hand, if τ cr < 0, we
have the opposite. It then follows immediately from Propositions 5 and 6 that:
Proposition 7. International tax competition raises capital taxes i.e. τ cr < 0 iﬀ km > max{lm, v0(w(1))},
and (weakly) lowers capital taxes otherwise.
To interpret this condition, note that what is required is that both (i) the median voter is a
”capitalist” i.e. km > lm and (ii) he does not value the public good too highly i.e. km > v
0(w(1). The
first condition ensures in equilibrium, the tax on labour is always at a maximum, and the second ensures
20See, for instance, Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991).
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that not all of the tax revenue from the labour tax is used to fund the public good, leaving some excess
to fund a capital subsidy.
Note that this comparison is rather simpler than in the case with no labour income tax. However,
this simplicity has been purchased at the cost of making a rather strong assumption about the joint
distribution of labour and capital endowments. The extent to which this assumption can be relaxed is
discussed in Section 5.3.
Before leaving this Section we also discuss briefly the case of non-negative taxes. If subsidies were
ruled out then, as it is obvious from the proof of Proposition 6, the ideal policy mix of the median voter
under CMI would still be given by Proposition 6 i.e. τor = 0. Accordingly, if either km < lm or v0(w(1))
> km > lm CMI would lead to an decrease in capital taxes, as Proposition 5 implies that τ cr > 0. If,
on the other hand, km > lm and km ≥ v0(w(1)) the median voter’s ideal capital tax under a closed
economy is at the corner, i.e. τ cr = 0. So, in the absence of subsidies, if the median voter is a capitalist
and does not value the public good highly, capital is not taxed whether the economy is closed or open.
Clearly, then, if subsidies cannot be deployed CMI cannot lead to higher capital taxes.
5 Extensions
5.1 Preference Heterogeneity
In Examples 1 and A1, labour income is assumed, for clarity, to be more unequally distributed than
capital income: km = 0.5 > 0 = lm. However, this is empirically implausible: the available evidence
suggests that wage income is less unequally distributed than non-wage income (see for instance Goodman
et. al. (1997)). However, it is possible to show that if we also allow heterogeneity in preferences, one
can generate the conclusion of a higher tax in the open economy than in the closed one, while having
labour income less unequally distributed than capital income: km < lm.
The idea is as follows. Assume the simple case with τw = 0. Suppose that the utility of agent
i from the public good is γiv(g). Then, making this substitution in (8) and dividing though by γi, we
can write payoﬀs up to a factor of proportionality as:
ui =



(F 0(1)− τr)αi + (w(1)− τw)βi + v(τr + τw) (closed)
roαi + (w(k˜)− τw)βi + v(τrk˜ + τw) (open)
(18)
where kiγi
= αi, liγi = βi. Call these preference-adjusted capital and labour endowments: these will
determine the median voters’ ideal taxes on the closed and open economies respectively. Then, as
Example 2 below shows, the idea is to choose the {γi}i∈N so that the actual distribution of endowments
has capital more unequally distributed than labour, but the preference-adjusted capital endowment
being less unequally distributed than the corresponding labour endowment: it is the latter that is
needed for τo > τ c.
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Example 2. Technology and v(g) are the same as in Example 1. So, the equilibrium tax in the closed
economy is given by
αp = v0(tck) = 1− ζtc, (19)
and the equilibrium tax in the open economy is given by
βq = v0(tok¯)
µ
1 +
to
k¯F 00(k¯)
¶
= (1− ζto)(1− t
o
φ ). (20)
Also, assume that n = 3.
Now choose (k1, k2, k3) = (0, 0.1, 0.9), (l1, l2, l3) = (0, 0.3, 0.7). Note that k2 < l2 < 1/3. This is a
world where endowments are unequally distributed (the distributions of endowments are left-skewed),
with capital income being more unequally distributed than non-capital income. Suppose that γ3 = 0.9
and γ2 = 0.1. These imply that (a1, a2, a3) = (0, 1, 1) and (β1,β2,β3) = (0, 3, 7/9). So, ap = 1 > 7/9 =
βq and p = q = 3. Also, the conditions for interior equilibria with non-negative world interest rate
reduce to
1 = v0(0) ≥ α3 = 1 ≥ v0(F 0(1)) = 1− ζ(1− φ)
1 = v0(0) ≥ β3 = 7/9 ≥ v0(F 0(1))/µ(F 0(1), 1) = (1− ζ(1− φ))
µ
1− (1− φ)φ
¶
.
Note then that tc = 0 < to, for any φ and ζ that satisfy the above inequalities.k
5.2 Relaxing the Intermediate Preference Assumption
One strong assumption made in Section 4 was that the endowments of capital and labour were linearly
related. This was done in order to demonstrate the existence of Condorcet winner in the closed economy,
when both labour and capital taxes could be set separately. Here, we briefly argue that this assumption
can be relaxed if some minimal assumptions are made on the voting agenda over the set of alternatives
Sc.
Assume that {ki}i∈N , {li}i∈N are perfectly rank-correlated, either positively or negatively. This
is equivalent to saying that ki = f(li), where f is either a strictly increasing or a strictly decreasing
function. This clearly weakens the assumption that ki = a+ bli made in Section 4.1. With this weaker
assumption, a Condorcet Winner will generally not exist in Sc. But suppose that we impose issue-by-
issue voting i.e. majority voting on either τr, followed by τw, or vice versa. Generally, as ui(τw, τr) is
not additively separable in τw, τr, the order of items on the agenda will matter. In particular, this will
occur when the median voter over τw is not the median voter over τr (see, for instance, Ordeshook(1986)
and Muller(1989)). In this case, issue-by-issue voting will give two possible outcomes, depending on the
agenda.
On the other hand, when endowments are perfectly (positively or negatively) rank-correlated,
then clearly voter m = (n+1)/2 is the median voter over both τw, τ r. In that case, whatever the order,
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m is eﬀectively dictator, so issue-by-issue majority voting will lead to a choice of (τw, τ r) that maximise
um(τw, τr) over the set of feasible taxes. Then, Proposition 5 - and therefore Proposition 7 - continues
to apply.
6 Related Literature
Apart from the seminal work of PT, and the paper of Kessler, Lufesman, and Myers(2002), our paper is
related to two parts of the now vast literature on capital tax competition. First, and most importantly,
there are papers that have explicitly or implicitly derived conditions under which Nash equilibrium taxes
rise in some or all countries following capital market integration.
The relevant work can be subdivided in two. First, there are contributions that study asymmetries
between countries. For example, DePater and Myers (1994) study a version of the ZMWmodel but allow
for asymmetric countries that do not take the world interest rate as fixed. In that model, if a country is
a suﬃciently large capital importer it will set a higher tax when capital becomes more mobile. This is
intuitive as a tax on capital lowers the interest rate i.e. the cost of capital to an importing country. In a
well-known paper, Wilson (1987) considers a model with trade in goods as well as capital: specifically,
two goods, one labour-intensive and one capital-intensive. In that model, even if countries are symmetric
ex ante, in equilibrium, one set of countries produces the capital-intensive good and set low tax rates
(these countries import capital), and the other set of countries produce the labour-intensive good and
set high tax rates (these countries export capital). In the first group of countries taxes are lower under
perfect capital mobility. This can be thought of as a model of endogenous asymmetry across countries.
Of course, the results of these papers are weaker than ours, in the sense that in equilibrium, only a
subset of the countries raise their taxes following capital market integration.
Second, some recent papers present symmetric models where under certain conditions, taxes in
all countries rise following capital market integration. The first, Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) relies
on a tax-exporting argument. They allow agents in one country to own share of the immobile factor
(land) in the other countries. So, following capital market integration, the capital tax set in any country
i is partially shifted to owners of land in other countries. If the level of foreign ownership is large
enough, taxes in all countries rise following capital market liberalization.21 Noiset(1995) and Wooders,
Zissimos and Dhillon(2001) consider a second variant of the ZMW model where the tax funds a public
infrastructure good, rather than a final good. If, at Nash equilibrium, the degree of complementarity
21A further paper that fits this category is Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), where tax jurisdictions are identical, but
there is a federal government which taxes capital as well. This feature introduces a vertical tax externality: countries do
not take into account the erosion of the federal tax base which results from an increase in local capital tax. If this vertical
externality is large relative to the standard horizontal tax externalities, then over-taxation will result.
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between capital and the infrastructure input is suﬃciently large,22 taxes with capital mobility will be
ineﬃciently high. The intuition is simply that with strong complementarity, countries have an incentive
to overinvest in infrastructure.
Our distinctive contribution to this literature is that we show that a tax rise following CMI is
possible when the political process is modelled realistically, not because of some economic modification
or elaboration of the ZMW model. Specifically, in our model, a benevolent (i.e. welfare maximizing)
dictator would always choose lower taxes in the open economy: higher taxes arise because of the
interaction of the ”dictatorship” of the median voter with the tax incidence eﬀect.
The second related literature comprises several papers that have studied choice of taxes via
majority voting in variants of the ZMW and related models. Grazzini and van Ypersele (1999) have
asymmetric countries and also heterogeneity of capital endowments. They study Nash equilibrium
taxes in the open economy with majority voting in each country, but do not study the closed economy
equilibrium (their focus is on when a proposal for a minimum tax on capital will be unanimously
accepted). Consequently, they do not identify the incidence and shifting median voter eﬀects. Kessler
et. al. (2000)’s model is very similar to Grazzini and van Ypersele (1999): heterogenous countries, and
also agents within a country diﬀering with respect to capital (but not labour) endowments.23 They
study Nash equilibria with majority voting in both countries both with and without capital mobility.
However, their additional assumptions ensure that in any country, the equilibrium tax is always lower
with capital mobility than without24.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides one possible explanation for why taxes on capital may not fall, but rise, following
capital market integration. Our explanation is based on three simple ingredients: equilibrium tax-
shifting in the ZMWmodel, heterogeneity between agents within countries, and decision-making through
a political process such as majority voting, rather than benevolent dictatorship. These interact to
produce the incidence eﬀect on equilibrium taxes following capital market integration. If the diﬀerences
between the median preference-adjusted endowments of the mobile factor (capital), and the fixed factor
(land) are large enough, the incidence eﬀect may more than oﬀset the usual eﬀects of tax competition,
22Specifically, the cross-partial derivative of output with respect to capital and infrastructure must be suﬃciently large
at Nash equilibrium. An assumption suﬃcient to rule this out was made by Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986) in their
original paper, so they also found under-taxation with an infrastructure public good.
23In fact, they just allow for two groups, rich and poor.
24Specifically, in their model, tax revenue is not spent on a public good but is returned in the form of a grant to every
agent. This can be formally captured in our model by writing γi = 1 and v(g) = g. Then, it is clear that in the closed
economy case, the median voter p will choose the maximum feasible tax because v0(g) = 1 > kp, and indeed, that is their
result. So, the open-economy tax cannot be higher than the closed-economy tax.
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and cause equilibrium taxes to rise. We also show that the same logic applies to the case where capital
and labour can be taxed separately.
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9 Appendix
Example A1. Preferences and technology are the same as in Example 1. Also, n = 3. We first write
down conditions that hold on k2, l2, the endowments of the median voter. Thus, as n = 3, the median
voer cannot own more than half the endowment of any asset, i.e. k2, l2 ≤ 0.5. Combining this with A1,
we get:
1/2 ≥ k2 ≥ 1− ζ(1− φ)
For this set of parameter values to be non-empty, we require
ζ ≥ 1/2 + ζφ (21)
Again, combining l2 ≤ 0.5 with A2, we get:
1/2 ≥ l2 ≥ [1− ζ(1− φ)](
2φ− 1
φ )
and for this set to be non-empty, we require
φ ≤ 3φζ + 1− ζ
3/2 + 2φζ (22)
Also, recall that
ζ < 1 + φζ (23)
from v0(F 0(1)) > 0. So, together, (21),(22),(23) with φ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0 define a feasible set for
φ, ζ. Next, note that in this example,
η = ψ
l
− 1
= µ(τ(k2), 1)− 1
=
1
1 + τ(k2)/F 00(1)
− 1
=
1
1− (1− k2)/ζφ
− 1
=
(1− k2)
c− (1− k2)
≤ 1
c− 1
where c = ζφ. So, it is clear that as c → ∞, then η → 0. Finally, it is possible to show that we can
choose25 feasible ζ,φ such that c = φζ for any c > 0. So, we can choose parameter values such that
η ' 0 to any desired approximation. ¤
25To see this define first 3c+1−ζ
3/2+2c
≡ f(ζ). Given this definition we have that the feasible set of φ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0 is
given by φ ≤ f(ζ) and ζ ∈ [0.5 + c, 1 + c). Note now that φζ = c implies that φ = c/ζ ≡ h(ζ). Thus in order to show the
validity of the argument in the main text we need to show, given any c > 0, that h(ζ) ∈ (0, 1) and h(ζ) ≤ f(ζ) for some
ζ ∈ [0.5 + c, 1 + c). Note that h0(ζ) < 0, f 0(ζ) < 0, h(ζ) ∈ (0, 1), 0 < h(1 + c) < f(1 + c) < h(1/2 + c) < f(1/2 + c) < 1.
Then, one can choose ζ ∈ [ζ∗, 1 + c] where ζ∗ is the maximum of 0.5 + c and of the largest solution of h(ζ) = f(ζ).
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Proof of Proposition 6. The equilibrium taxes maximise (17) subject to τw ≤ w(k(ro + τr)), 0 ≤
τ rk˜ + tw. Ignoring the latter constraint, the first-order conditions are:
−lm + v0(τw + k˜τ r)− ξ = 0
−k˜lm + v0(τw + k˜τ r)[k˜ + τrk0]− ξk˜ = 0
So, if the constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro + τ r)) is not binding, ξ = 0, and we have
−lm + v0(τw + k˜τr) = 0
−k˜lm + v0(τw + k˜τr)[k˜ + τ rk0] = 0
At equilibrium, k˜ = 1, and so
−lm + v0(τw + τr) = 0
−lm + v0(τw + τr)[1 + τ rk0] = 0
The unique solution to these equations is τ r = 0, lm = v0(τw). Given v0(0) > lm we have that τw > 0
and thereby positive provision. For the constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro+τr)) not to be binding at this solution,
we require τw ≤ w(1), and thus lm ≥ v0(w(1)).
If the constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro + τr)) is binding, ξ > 0 and we have τw = w(k(ro + τ r)) = w(1)
in equilibrium. Also, in equilibrium, as k˜ = 1, τr and ξ solve
−lm + v0(w(1) + τr)− ξ = 0
−lm + v0(w(1) + τ r)[1 + τrk0]− ξ = 0.
and hence τ r = 0, and ξ = v0(w(1)) − lm. As τr = 0 and τw = w(1), provision is positive. For the
constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro+τr)) to be binding at this solution, we require ξ > 0 and thus lm < v0(w(1)). ¤
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